PRISON CELL SEARCHES - THE GOOD, THE BAD AND THE UGLY
Cell searches by staff in prisons and jails are a common and necessary security action, but are an intensely intrusive act that can do more harm than good when done incorrectly, or for improper and unprofessional purposes. Few staff (or administrators) stop to think of the ramifications of shakedowns gone wrong - but here's an overview - and a potential fix for many of the problems associated with cell searches.
Imagine if you will that your home is burglarized, and someone goes through all of your belongings. Even if nothing is taken, the VIOLATION of knowing that someone has looked through, inspected and touched your most private of possessions - from your underwear to your food, sacred religious items and even your private documents and cherished photos - is overwhelming. If items are taken, it's worse, but imagine how that feeling lingers when a week later, you discover things missing that you hadn't discovered were missing immediately after the burglary. What else might be missing that you haven't yet discovered missing? The emotions are overwhelmingly frustrating.
Now, imagine that this happens to you every month, with the possibility of it happening every day - and that there is nothing you can do to stop it. This is how most prisoners live - every hour of their lives.
In prison, there is no (legal) expectation of privacy on the part of prisoners, and staff have almost unlimiited authority to conduct cell searches at any time - for any or even no articulatable reason. Courts have ruled that prison officials are not required to obtain a warrant to search or seize property within a prison, or even to give notice that a search will take place. At most, prisoners may complain AFTER a search that the search constituted harassment, that items taken were authorized or that searching staff harmed or destroyed personal property items. To prevail, prisoners must have receipts for the item destroyed (despite limitations on property levels/paperwork), and must accept as low as 25 percent of the purchase / replacement price depending on the age of the item. The cost of the reimbursement is paid from the Inmate Management Fund. Harassment claims are rarely even investigated.
The IDOC maintains Standard Operating Procedures regarding cell searches (SOP 317.02.01.001), yet it is rarely followed as either impractical or inconvenient for staff. Post Orders, Operational Memoranda and standing orders from (housing) unit Lieutenants and Sergeants also play a part in how (and when) unit staff conduct cell searches. Staff availability (too few or too many staff), Field training [of staff trainees], staff desire (or compunction) - intelligence (suspicion or knowledge of contraband within a cell) - time of year (holiday or sporting events which traditionally comport with the desire to drink homemade alcohol), staff prejudice and NIGYYSOB [Now I Got You You SOB] - even the attitudes of prisoners and cell condition (cleanliness/amount of propery) all contribute to when (time of day/week/month), frequency and how "hard" a cell is searched.
Cell searches focus on 3 primary targets: items representing a safety/security threat, items of "excess" property and items considered "nuisance" contraband. While there is some overlap, secondary targets include property which may belong to other prisoners, state property held for personal use and altered, broken or destroyed items. All too often, staff will confiscate items which are not contraband, but simply offend [their] sensibilities, or are outside their personal comfort zone. While these items are sometimes returned to the prisoner, many times, the items are "lost" or discarded as trash by the searching officer, with no paperwork being generated.
Each of these types of contraband can always be considered (or justified as) dangerous in their own way - but it's when staff use their unlimited authority to search cells as a cover to retaliate against a prisoner, satisfy their voyeuristic desires, curtail a prisoner's exercise of rights - use pretextual rationale' or conduct searches in a manner so as to harass or build a reputation (for the officer) that things can go terribly wrong and create frustrations that are manifest in seemingly unrelated ways.
An example of this illegitimate use of power was clearly and unabashedly illustrated when moving segregation prisoners to recreation "cages" at the IMSI. Staff would inform prisoners that they had the right to an hour in the outdoor "rec cage", but advised them that if they went out, they (staff) would search the cell while they (prisoners) were outside. While staff certainly had the right to search the cell (at any time), and it would certainly be easier to search the cell while the prisoner was outside rather than having to secure the prisoner in the shower (or other area) while conducting the search, it was made clear (by staff) that prisoners choosing to go outside would result in a cell search.
Staff freely admit this (cell search threat) tactic is employed in an attempt to reduce the number of prisoners who would exercise their right to recreation activities due to the lack of sufficient numbers of cages to accomodate all prisoners in a single recreation period, as well as to reduce the extra time and workload on staff having to restrain and escort a higher number of prisoners to and from recreation. Were there an actual or perceived threat of contraband possession, it would logically follow that cell searches would have been conducted - immediately - regardless of whether prisoners chose to recreate or not.
Some staff will spend (literally) hours in a single cell, looking through every scrap of paper, photo and item, leaving the cell in shambles with bags of items considered (some sort of) contraband (hard search). These searches are most often intended to create tensions, frustrations and backlash between the prisoner and the staff. Another officer may spend 10 to 15 minutes in the exact same cell, under the exact same circumstances, leaving the cell relatively ordered with but few items confiscated - with security goals achieved and no animosity between prisoner and staff.
Some staff conducting cell searches simply enjoy the activity due to their voyeuristic tendencies under the guise of searching for contraband - usually photos. These staff are usually the very same ones that remove items based on personal sensibilites rather than SOP restrictions, and conduct "hard" searches on a daily basis. These staff consider themselves "thorough" in their searches, but are viewed by other staff and prisoners as either lazy (choosing to spend time sitting in a cell leafing through magazines and photo albums rather than on the floor doing other, more difficult jobs) or "creepy". Ranking staff, those staff other than correctional officers (such as Corporals and Sergeants and non-uniformed staff) who constantly search cells are almost always viewed with the "creepy" lens, and are the most likely to remove items not considered contraband, but are personally offensive based on religion, upbringing or other such factors. These are also the staff most likely to "lose" or "trash" items without documentation, and to fail to disclose that the items have been confiscated.
Removing items without notifying the prisoner(s) not only in violation of SOP, it creates frustration and animosity not only towards staff, but between prisoners, often leading to violence. For example, if an officer takes a photo from the photo album of Inmate A and does not document the confisaction or at least notify Inmate A, and Inmate A finds it missing a few days later, the presumption is that another prisoner assigned to the cell (Inmate B) has either taken it, or allowed someone else to take it, and the fight (or worse) is on. Even something as mundane as a missing styrofoam cup - issued to a prisoner and confiscated by a guard and only discovered missing a week later - can lead to such hatred and discontent that violence can erupt.
Many times, an officer who has conducted a search (without knowledge of prisoners) and removed items from a cell has failed to document even the fact of the search, much less the confiscation of items therefrom. Cell and other such searches are required to be noted in a dedicated log by staff performing the search and failure to note the search in the log is "proof" that the cell was NOT searched. This usually occurs when either the officer does not want a confrontation with a particuar prisoner whose cell has been searched, the officer has improperly and without documentation removed item(s), has either forgotten or ran out of time to enter the search into the log (other duties, going home, emergencies, etc.) or, as is usually the case where personal bias is in play, the officer wants the cell to be searched more than is routine - but has no (official) justification for doing so.
While cell and living area searches are admittedly necessary in the prison environment, there are ways to make searches more effective, less obtrusive and less frustrating for all.
First, officers need to make documenting when a cell is searched, and by whom, a priority. Next, prisoners need to be informed when a cell has been searched, and be allowed to see ALL items removed - INCLUDING items which officers consider trash and will throw away rather than document (one person's trash is another's treasure). Finally, staff need to concentrate on items which are considered dangerous and instruct the prisoner to remove excess or other such items from their cell on their own before the next search. This not only frees staff up to perform other duties, but instills in the prisoners a bit of responsibility for themselves - one of the basic building blocks of rehabilitation.
IDOC administrators would be well served to create "search teams" within each facility whose primary duties would be to conduct searches of housing areas. These teams - independent from unit staff - would be specially trained in prisoner property allowances, medical device and (KOP) medication identifications, religious item and legal document handling and would search any cells within the facility at random, with targeted searches based on any other need or intelligence. With uniform searches throughout the facility, bias of, and inconsistencies of unit staff would be removed from the equation, though unit (or any other) staff would still be able to search a cell in the event such a need were to arise. Documentation of searches and contraband confiscations would be consistent and staff assigned to the teams would be more accountable for their actions during the handling of prisoner property.
Search team members who show specific bias towards items allowed based on religious grounds or upbringing would be identified and assigned to other duties. Staff who are identified as having or displaying voyeuristic tendencies or other such issues would also be reassigned to a different post. Such vetting would not only create a more effective, professional and responsible team, the instances of prisoner property damage, improper handling of religious and legal materials and other search-related problems would be reduced, which would in turn reduce the number of prisoner grievances, lawsuits and of course - frustrations.
Oh, and as has been a consistent theme in the IDOC WAR ON BOOBS postings on this blog... leave the boobies alone. When your staff are spending 30 percent (or more) of their time looking through magazines, photos and videos searching for what might or might not be a female breast, that is not time (or tax dollars) well spent, and does nothing to increase security of the staff, prisoners or the public.
DS
Imagine if you will that your home is burglarized, and someone goes through all of your belongings. Even if nothing is taken, the VIOLATION of knowing that someone has looked through, inspected and touched your most private of possessions - from your underwear to your food, sacred religious items and even your private documents and cherished photos - is overwhelming. If items are taken, it's worse, but imagine how that feeling lingers when a week later, you discover things missing that you hadn't discovered were missing immediately after the burglary. What else might be missing that you haven't yet discovered missing? The emotions are overwhelmingly frustrating.
Now, imagine that this happens to you every month, with the possibility of it happening every day - and that there is nothing you can do to stop it. This is how most prisoners live - every hour of their lives.
In prison, there is no (legal) expectation of privacy on the part of prisoners, and staff have almost unlimiited authority to conduct cell searches at any time - for any or even no articulatable reason. Courts have ruled that prison officials are not required to obtain a warrant to search or seize property within a prison, or even to give notice that a search will take place. At most, prisoners may complain AFTER a search that the search constituted harassment, that items taken were authorized or that searching staff harmed or destroyed personal property items. To prevail, prisoners must have receipts for the item destroyed (despite limitations on property levels/paperwork), and must accept as low as 25 percent of the purchase / replacement price depending on the age of the item. The cost of the reimbursement is paid from the Inmate Management Fund. Harassment claims are rarely even investigated.
The IDOC maintains Standard Operating Procedures regarding cell searches (SOP 317.02.01.001), yet it is rarely followed as either impractical or inconvenient for staff. Post Orders, Operational Memoranda and standing orders from (housing) unit Lieutenants and Sergeants also play a part in how (and when) unit staff conduct cell searches. Staff availability (too few or too many staff), Field training [of staff trainees], staff desire (or compunction) - intelligence (suspicion or knowledge of contraband within a cell) - time of year (holiday or sporting events which traditionally comport with the desire to drink homemade alcohol), staff prejudice and NIGYYSOB [Now I Got You You SOB] - even the attitudes of prisoners and cell condition (cleanliness/amount of propery) all contribute to when (time of day/week/month), frequency and how "hard" a cell is searched.
Cell searches focus on 3 primary targets: items representing a safety/security threat, items of "excess" property and items considered "nuisance" contraband. While there is some overlap, secondary targets include property which may belong to other prisoners, state property held for personal use and altered, broken or destroyed items. All too often, staff will confiscate items which are not contraband, but simply offend [their] sensibilities, or are outside their personal comfort zone. While these items are sometimes returned to the prisoner, many times, the items are "lost" or discarded as trash by the searching officer, with no paperwork being generated.
Each of these types of contraband can always be considered (or justified as) dangerous in their own way - but it's when staff use their unlimited authority to search cells as a cover to retaliate against a prisoner, satisfy their voyeuristic desires, curtail a prisoner's exercise of rights - use pretextual rationale' or conduct searches in a manner so as to harass or build a reputation (for the officer) that things can go terribly wrong and create frustrations that are manifest in seemingly unrelated ways.
An example of this illegitimate use of power was clearly and unabashedly illustrated when moving segregation prisoners to recreation "cages" at the IMSI. Staff would inform prisoners that they had the right to an hour in the outdoor "rec cage", but advised them that if they went out, they (staff) would search the cell while they (prisoners) were outside. While staff certainly had the right to search the cell (at any time), and it would certainly be easier to search the cell while the prisoner was outside rather than having to secure the prisoner in the shower (or other area) while conducting the search, it was made clear (by staff) that prisoners choosing to go outside would result in a cell search.
Staff freely admit this (cell search threat) tactic is employed in an attempt to reduce the number of prisoners who would exercise their right to recreation activities due to the lack of sufficient numbers of cages to accomodate all prisoners in a single recreation period, as well as to reduce the extra time and workload on staff having to restrain and escort a higher number of prisoners to and from recreation. Were there an actual or perceived threat of contraband possession, it would logically follow that cell searches would have been conducted - immediately - regardless of whether prisoners chose to recreate or not.
Some staff will spend (literally) hours in a single cell, looking through every scrap of paper, photo and item, leaving the cell in shambles with bags of items considered (some sort of) contraband (hard search). These searches are most often intended to create tensions, frustrations and backlash between the prisoner and the staff. Another officer may spend 10 to 15 minutes in the exact same cell, under the exact same circumstances, leaving the cell relatively ordered with but few items confiscated - with security goals achieved and no animosity between prisoner and staff.
Some staff conducting cell searches simply enjoy the activity due to their voyeuristic tendencies under the guise of searching for contraband - usually photos. These staff are usually the very same ones that remove items based on personal sensibilites rather than SOP restrictions, and conduct "hard" searches on a daily basis. These staff consider themselves "thorough" in their searches, but are viewed by other staff and prisoners as either lazy (choosing to spend time sitting in a cell leafing through magazines and photo albums rather than on the floor doing other, more difficult jobs) or "creepy". Ranking staff, those staff other than correctional officers (such as Corporals and Sergeants and non-uniformed staff) who constantly search cells are almost always viewed with the "creepy" lens, and are the most likely to remove items not considered contraband, but are personally offensive based on religion, upbringing or other such factors. These are also the staff most likely to "lose" or "trash" items without documentation, and to fail to disclose that the items have been confiscated.
Removing items without notifying the prisoner(s) not only in violation of SOP, it creates frustration and animosity not only towards staff, but between prisoners, often leading to violence. For example, if an officer takes a photo from the photo album of Inmate A and does not document the confisaction or at least notify Inmate A, and Inmate A finds it missing a few days later, the presumption is that another prisoner assigned to the cell (Inmate B) has either taken it, or allowed someone else to take it, and the fight (or worse) is on. Even something as mundane as a missing styrofoam cup - issued to a prisoner and confiscated by a guard and only discovered missing a week later - can lead to such hatred and discontent that violence can erupt.
Many times, an officer who has conducted a search (without knowledge of prisoners) and removed items from a cell has failed to document even the fact of the search, much less the confiscation of items therefrom. Cell and other such searches are required to be noted in a dedicated log by staff performing the search and failure to note the search in the log is "proof" that the cell was NOT searched. This usually occurs when either the officer does not want a confrontation with a particuar prisoner whose cell has been searched, the officer has improperly and without documentation removed item(s), has either forgotten or ran out of time to enter the search into the log (other duties, going home, emergencies, etc.) or, as is usually the case where personal bias is in play, the officer wants the cell to be searched more than is routine - but has no (official) justification for doing so.
While cell and living area searches are admittedly necessary in the prison environment, there are ways to make searches more effective, less obtrusive and less frustrating for all.
First, officers need to make documenting when a cell is searched, and by whom, a priority. Next, prisoners need to be informed when a cell has been searched, and be allowed to see ALL items removed - INCLUDING items which officers consider trash and will throw away rather than document (one person's trash is another's treasure). Finally, staff need to concentrate on items which are considered dangerous and instruct the prisoner to remove excess or other such items from their cell on their own before the next search. This not only frees staff up to perform other duties, but instills in the prisoners a bit of responsibility for themselves - one of the basic building blocks of rehabilitation.
IDOC administrators would be well served to create "search teams" within each facility whose primary duties would be to conduct searches of housing areas. These teams - independent from unit staff - would be specially trained in prisoner property allowances, medical device and (KOP) medication identifications, religious item and legal document handling and would search any cells within the facility at random, with targeted searches based on any other need or intelligence. With uniform searches throughout the facility, bias of, and inconsistencies of unit staff would be removed from the equation, though unit (or any other) staff would still be able to search a cell in the event such a need were to arise. Documentation of searches and contraband confiscations would be consistent and staff assigned to the teams would be more accountable for their actions during the handling of prisoner property.
Search team members who show specific bias towards items allowed based on religious grounds or upbringing would be identified and assigned to other duties. Staff who are identified as having or displaying voyeuristic tendencies or other such issues would also be reassigned to a different post. Such vetting would not only create a more effective, professional and responsible team, the instances of prisoner property damage, improper handling of religious and legal materials and other search-related problems would be reduced, which would in turn reduce the number of prisoner grievances, lawsuits and of course - frustrations.
Oh, and as has been a consistent theme in the IDOC WAR ON BOOBS postings on this blog... leave the boobies alone. When your staff are spending 30 percent (or more) of their time looking through magazines, photos and videos searching for what might or might not be a female breast, that is not time (or tax dollars) well spent, and does nothing to increase security of the staff, prisoners or the public.
DS